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It is shown that the independence of the continuum hypothesis points
to the unique definite status of the set of intermediate cardinality: the
intermediate set exists only as a subset of continuum. This latent status
is a consequence of duality of the members of the set. Due to the struc-
tural inhomogeneity of the intermediate set, its complete description falls
into several “sections” (theories) with their special main laws, dimensions,
and directions, i.e., the complete description of the one-dimensional in-
termediate set is multidimensional (all the members of the set cannot be
arranged in the same line). Quantum mechanics is one of these theories.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Bz, 02.10.Cz, 11.25.-w
The set of intermediate cardinality represents a golden mean between the
two opposing concepts of continuous and discrete space. But although the
continuum problem has been solved [1], the status of the set of intermediate
cardinality is still unclear. However, it may be stated that the independence
of the continuum hypothesis (CH) determines a unique definite status of the
intermediate set.
There are the following two key points: First, the intermediate set, by defi-
nition, must be a subset of continuum (continuum must contain a subset equiv-
alent to the intermediate set). Second, any separation of the subset is a proof
of existence of the intermediate set, which contradicts the independence of CH.
Comparing this points, we arrive at the following conclusion: existence of the
subset of intermediate cardinality in continuum does not require any additional
assumption and does not contradict the independence of CH on condition that
this subset, in principle, cannot be separated from continuum.
This is the only possible understanding of the independence of CH if Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory is consistent, complete, and giving the correct description
of the notion of set, i.e., if the independence of CH is the ultimate solution of
the continuum problem in the framework of good set theory of full value.
Note that this latent status is the only definite status of the set of inter-
mediate cardinality that follows from the generally accepted solution of the
continuum problem.
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Neither CH nor its negation may be taken as an axiom because they both
are not obvious. But it is worthwhile to emphasize that if we take CH as an
axiom this subset will be lost. Therefore, CH is not admissible hypothesis. On
the other hand, if we take not-CH as an axiom we shall get the following result:
since any separation or any construction of the intermediate set are forbidden
by the independence of CH, we have to reconcile with the same “hidden” subset
in continuum which we can get without any additional assumption.
According to the separation axiom schema, for any set and for any property
expressed by some formula there exists a subset of the set, which contains only
members of the set having the property. Then some subset cannot be separated
from continuum if each point of the subset does not have its own peculiar prop-
erties but only combines properties of the members of the countable set and
continuum (duality). Only these properties do not contradict the independence
of CH because they do not allow separation of the intermediate set from con-
tinuum. If the members of the set of intermediate cardinality had any unique
property, then it would be possible to separate them and to prove existence of
the intermediate set.
Note that the content of the duality coincides with the content of wave-
particle duality: quantum particle combines properties of a wave (continuum)
and a point-like particle (the countable set).
As an illustration, consider a brick road which consists of black bricks and
white bricks. If we know (or suspect) that among them there are some bricks
which have white top sides and black bottom sides (or vice versa, i.e., these
bricks combine the sides “from” the white brick and “from” the black brick),
we, nevertheless, cannot find them. Based only on the top view, the problem of
separation (and even existence) of the black-and-white bricks of this kind is un-
decidable. Each brick can be black-and-white with equal probability. However,
if we have the top view and the bottom view, we can find these bricks: each of
them looks like a white brick in the one view and like a black brick in the other
view (“black-white duality”).
In the general case, we can get an undecidable statement, analogous to CH,
if we have a set consisting of members of two or more kinds: except for the
members of the kinds, we must take into account possibility of the dual or even
polymorphic members. At present, set theory do not allow for such members
because they do not seem to be elementary enough. Indeed, it is hard to believe
that in a box with the black balls and the white balls there is a ball which
looks either like a black ball or like a white ball subject to the examination. In
order to be “two-faced” such a ball needs some actuating mechanism. However,
this behavior is similar to the ordinary behavior of the elementary quantum
objects: in quantum mechanics, we have space continuum of classical mechanics
(a macroscopic measuring apparatus describing by classical rules) and, inside
this continuum, some dual objects (microscopic particles) “looking” either like
wave or like a point-like particle depending on the experiment.
In order to get information about the “invisible” set consider the maps of
the intermediate set I to the sets of real numbers (R) and natural numbers (N).
Let the map I ! N decompose I into the countable set of equivalent mutu-
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ally disjoint infinite subsets: [In = I (n 2 N). Let In be called a unit set. All
members of In have the same countable coordinate n.
Consider the map I ! R. Continuum R contains a subset M equivalent to
I, i.e., there exists a bijection
f : I !M  R. (1)
This bijection reduces to a separation of the intermediate subsetM from contin-
uum. Since any separation procedure is a proof of existence of the intermediate
set and, therefore, contradicts the independence of the continuum hypothesis,
we, in principle, do not have a rule for assigning a definite real number to a
point of the intermediate set. Hence, any bijection can take a point of the in-
termediate set only to a random real number. If we do not have preferable real
numbers, then we have the equiprobable mapping. This already conforms to
the quantum free particle. In the general case, we have the probability P (r)dr
of finding a point s 2 I about r.
Thus the point of the intermediate set has two coordinates: a definite natural
number and a random real number:
s : (n, rrandom). (2)
Only the natural number coordinate gives reliable information about the relative
positions of the points of the set and the size of its interval. But the points of
a unit set are indistinguishable. It is clear that the probability P (r) depends
on the natural number coordinate of the corresponding point. Note that the
information about a point in the one-dimensional intermediate set is necessarily
two-dimensional.
For two real numbers a and b the probability Pa[bdr of finding s in the union
of the neighborhoods (dr)a [ (dr)b
Pa[b dr 6= [P (a) + P (b)] dr (3)
because s corresponds to both (all) points at the same time (the events are
not mutually exclusive). It is convenient to introduce a function ψ(r) such that
P (r) = P [ψ(r)] and ψa[b = ψ(a)+ψ(b). The idea is to compute the non-additive
probability from some additive object by a simple rule.
We have
Pa[b = P(ψa[b) = P [ψ(a) + ψ(b)] 6= P [ψ(a)] + P [ψ(b)], (4)
i.e., the dependence P [ψ(r)] is non-linear. The simplest non-linear dependence
is a square dependence:
P [ψ(r)] = jψ(r)j2. (5)
The probability P (r) is not probability density because we cannot integrate
it due to its non-additivity (an integral is a sum). The normalization condition
means only that f is a bijection: we can find only one image of the point s in R.
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But this is coincidence. Actually, the concept of probability should be modified,
since the additivity law is one of the axioms of the conventional probability
theory.
An illustration in terms of the above brick road will make this clear: If we
know the exact number NB−W of the black-and-white bricks, we do not need
to check all the bricks of perhaps infinite brick road. It is reasonable to stop





where PB−W is the probability of finding a black-and-white brick, Nchecked is
the exact (minimal) number of the bricks checked. Thus only Nchecked may vary
in the different test runs (finding all the black-and-white bricks). We can refine
Nchecked by replicate test runs but, in fact, we get one more problem: stability
or, in the general case, behavior of Nchecked in the different test runs (in other
words, the form of time dependence Nchecked(t)).
In [2] Feynman wrote: “The concept of probability is not altered in quantum
mechanics. When we say the probability of a certain outcome of an experiment
is p, we mean the conventional thing, i.e., that if the experiment is repeated
many times, one expects that the fraction of those which give the outcome in
question is roughly p.”
It is clear what will happen “if the experiment is repeated many times” after
all the black-and-white bricks have been already found.
The concept of probability for continuum should also be modified, since the
point may be always found in a finite interval. We do not need to take into
account remaining empty continuum.
But we shall not alter the concept of probability because it “is not altered
in quantum mechanics”. This means that we shall regard P (r) = jψ(r)j2 as a
probability density, i.e., we accept Born postulate. The main purpose of the
paper is to show that quantum mechanics describes the set of intermediate
cardinality.
The function ψ, necessarily, depends on n: ψ(r) ! ψ(n, r). Since n is
accurate up to a constant (shift) and the function ψ is defined up to the factor
eiconst, we have
ψ(n+ const, r) = eiconstψ(n, r). (7)
Hence, the function ψ is of the following form:
ψ(r, n) = A(r)e2piin. (8)
Thus the point of the intermediate set corresponds to the function Eq.(8) in
continuum. We can specify the point by the function ψ(n, r) before the mapping
and by the random real number and the natural number when the mapping has
performed. In other words, the function ψ(n, r) may be regarded as the image
of s in R between mappings.
Consider probability P (b, a) of finding the point s at b after finding it at
a. Let us use a continuous parameter t for correlation between continuous and
4
countable coordinates of the point s (simultaneity) and in order to distinguish
between the different mappings (events ordering):
r(ta), n(ta) ! ψ(t) ! r(tb), n(tb), (9)
where ta < t < tb and ψ(t) = ψ[n(t), r(t)]. For simplicity, we shall identify the
parameter with time without further discussion. Note that we cannot use the
direct dependence n = n(r). Since r = r(n) is a random number, the inverse
function is meaningless.
Assume that s is an “observable” point, i.e., for each t 2 (ta, tb) there exists
the image of the point in continuum R.
Partition interval (ta, tb) into k equal parts ε:
kε = tb − ta,
ε = ti − ti−1,
ta = t0, tb = tk, (10)
a = r(ta) = r0, b = r(tk) = rk.
The conditional probability of of finding the point s at r(ti) after r(ti−1) is
given by




(unmonitored zone between ti−1 and ti will be reduced to zero by passage to
the limit ε! 0), i.e.,






where ∆ni = jn(ti)− n(ti−1)j. Note that ∆ni is really a vector.
The probability of the sequence of the transitions
r0, . . . , ri, . . . rk (13)
is given by
P (r0, . . . , ri, . . . rk) = P (r1, r2)   P (ri−1, ri)   P (rk−1, rk), (14)
i.e.,











Then probability of the corresponding continuous sequence of the transitions
r(t):
P [r(t)] = lim
ε!0













Since at any time ta < t < tb the point s corresponds to all points of
R, it also corresponds to all continuous random sequences of mappings r(t)
simultaneously.
Probability P [r(t)] of finding the point at any time ta  t  tb on r(t) is
non-additive too. Therefore, we introduce an additive functional φ[r(t)]. In the
same way as above, we get
P [r(t)] = jφ[r(t)]j2. (18)




e2piim = const e2piim. (19)
Thus we have




i.e., the probability P (a, b) of finding the point s at b after finding it at a
satisfies the conditions of Feynman’s approach (section 2-2 of [2]) for S/h¯ =
2pim. Therefore,
P (b, a) = jK(b, a)j2, (21)





Since Feynman does not essentially use in Chap. 2 that S/h¯ is just action, the
identification of 2pim and S/h¯ may be postponed.
In section 2-3 of [2] Feynman explains how the principle of least action follows
from the dependence




We can apply the same nonrigourous reasoning to Eq.(20) and, for “very, very”
large m, get “the principle of least m”. This also means that for large m the
point s has a definite stationary path and, consequently, a definite continuous
coordinate. In other words, the corresponding interval of the intermediate set
is sufficiently close to continuum (let the interval be called macroscopic), i.e.,
cardinality of the intermediate set depends on its size. Recall that we can
measure the size of an interval of the set only in the unit sets (some packets of
points).
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dn(t) = min. (24)
The function n(t) may be regarded as some function of r(t): n(t) = η[r(t)]. It








r˙ dt = min, (25)
where dηdr r˙ is some function of r, r˙, and t (note absence of higher time derivatives
than r˙). This is a formulation of the principle of least action, i.e., large m can
be identified with action.
Since the value of action depends on units of measurement, we need a pa-




L(r, r˙, t) dt = S. (26)
Finally, we may substitute S/h¯ for 2pim in Eq.(22) and consider Feynman’s
formulation of quantum mechanics as a description of the set of intermediate
cardinality.
Since cardinality of an interval of the intermediate set depends on its size,
we have three basic kinds of the interval:
Macroscopic interval. This interval is large enough to be regarded as con-
tinuos. It has non-zero length.
Microscopic interval. This interval may not be regarded as continuos. It has
no length, i.e., its continuos image is exactly a point.
Submicroscopic interval. It is an intermediate kind of the interval with un-
stable random length. Its length is either zero or non-zero random real number
depending on mapping. This property is just wave-particle duality: the submi-
croscopic interval looks either like a point or like a continuous interval. Due to
the factor e2piim in Eq.(19), this instability shows periodic character and may
be described by means of the concept of wave. Oscillatory instability makes the
difference between the “classical” inexact length and quantum random length
(and, in combination with non-additivity, between classical and quantum prob-
abilities). Submicroscopic intervals make the region of quantum mechanics.
Note that we can substitute action for m only for sufficiently high time rate
of change of the countable coordinate n because, if ∆ni = jn(ti) − n(ti−1)j
in Eq.(24) is not sufficiently large to be considered as an (even infinitesimal)
interval of continuum, action reduces to zero. In other words, the change in size
of the intermediate set, from ta to tb, should not be microscopic (exact zero,
from macroscopic point of view). Zero-action may be understood as vanishing
of mass of the point. Recall that mass is a factor which appear in Lagrangian
of a free point as a peculiar property of the point under consideration, i.e.,
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formally, mass may be regarded as a consequence of the principle of least action
[3] and, consequently, of the sufficiently high time rate of change of the countable
coordinate (cardinality). Figuratively, mass is something like air drag which is
substantial only for sufficiently fast bodies.
Consider the special case of constant time rate of change ν of the countable
coordinate n. We have m = ν(tb − ta). Then “the principle of least m” reduces
to “the principle of least tb − ta”. If ν is not sufficiently large (massless point),
this is the simplest form of Fermat’s least time principle for light. The more






dt = min, (27)





where v(t) = dr/dt. In the case of non-zero action (mass point), the principle of
least action and Fermat’s principle “work” simultaneously. It is clear that any
additional factor can only increase the “pure least” time. As a result, tb − ta
for a massless point bounds below tb − ta for any other point and, therefore,
(b − a)/(tb − ta) for massless point bounds above average speed between the
same points a and b for continuous image of any point of the intermediate set.
This is a step towards special relativity.
Galileo’s relativity principle may be considered as a consequence of replace-
ment, in the macroscopic case, of the absolute natural number by the integral
(action): the integrand (Lagrangian) is defined up to the total time derivative.
This lack of uniqueness results in the relativity principle (in a sense, microscopic
absolute space turns to macroscopic relative space).
In consequence of size-dependence of the intermediate set, there is no need
of an external continuous container-set in order to satisfy the basic conclusion
that the set of intermediate cardinality must be a subset of continuum. The in-
termediate set is contained in its own sufficiently large interval. This container-
interval corresponds to the Copenhagen macroscopic measuring apparatus. In
other words, the intermediate set is a substantially microscopic set. Separation
of the intermediate subset from continuum, in some figurative sense, means “en-
largement” of the subset which in turn means increasing of its cardinality and,
as a consequence, loss of “microscopicity” of the set.
Since the principle of least action is an intrinsic property of the set of inter-
mediate cardinality relating to the macroscopic intervals of the set, it may be
stated that classical mechanics is a description of the macroscopic intermediate
intervals.
Quantum mechanics describes the submicroscopic intervals in terms of the
continuous description. This description also has its particular main law: the
wave equation.
From macroscopic point of view, there are two kinds of points: the true
points and the composite points. A composite point (the microscopic interval)
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consist of an infinite number of points. It is uniquely determined by the natural
number of unit sets. Cardinality of the proper microscopic interval may be
regarded as some qualitative property of the point. If the interval is destroyed
(decay of the corresponding point), this property vanishes and turns to the
properties (cardinalities) of the output intervals.
Thus the description of the proper microscopic intervals reduces to the de-
scription of transmutation of expanded (non-local) but, at the same time, point-
like objects and their properties, i.e., it is similar to particle physics phenomenol-
ogy and some aspects of string theories (but without tension and length of a
string). It is clear that the proper microscopic description appears only in
combination with at least one of the other descriptions. The submicroscopic
description combines with the macroscopic one (the macroscopic measuring ap-
paratus).
We see that the complete description of the set of intermediate cardinal-
ity falls into a chain of three theories. Each theory corresponds to a class of
approximately equivalent intervals (scale). Non-equivalent macroscopic, submi-
croscopic, and microscopic intervals of the set of intermediate cardinality may
not be regarded as the same homogeneous axis. As a result the description of
the one-dimensional intermediate set is three-dimensional (or four-dimensional,
including time). Thus we have three separate descriptions with their own par-
ticular main laws, dimensions, and directions.
At present, all the theories are imbedded in the continuous space of classical
mechanics. As a result, the dimensions and the directions of the submicroscopic
and microscopic descriptions are lost.
The total number of space time dimensions of three 3D descriptions is ten.
The same number of dimensions appear in string theories. But the extra di-
mensions of the intermediate set are essentially microscopic and do not require
compactification.
The directions of the submicroscopic and microscopic descriptions are re-
placed with spin. Reliable separation of the descriptions needs careful exami-
nation but it may be preliminarily stated that integer spin is the direction of
the microscopic description and half integer spin is the direction of the submi-
croscopic one. Since the submicroscopic interval is the (unstable) continuous
interval, its direction is associated with the direction of the macroscopic con-
tinuous interval. Therefore, the submicroscopic direction is not a vector of full
value but only spinor.
The direction of the point-like proper microscopic interval is independent of
the continuous direction.
Since the microscopic intervals are essentially non-equivalent, it should be
expected that the proper microscopic description in turn splits into several “the-
ories” subject to the number of microscopic scales (distinguishable cardinalities).
The similar situation is considered as a disadvantage of string theories. This
non-equivalent intervals form additional microscopic extra dimensions down to
the single unit set.
Thus the answer to the question “why fermions and bosons obey different
statistics?” may be very short: “because they belongs to the different de-
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scriptions”. The Pauli exclusion principle is a condition for keeping inside the
submicroscopic description (in other words, this is just a condition of conserva-
tion of submicroscopic cardinality): if two points at a submicroscopic distance
come close enough, in the sense of the countable coordinate, they form the
proper microscopic interval and go over to the proper microscopic description.
In this case, some macroscopic and submicroscopic properties of the points of
the interval may be lost.
Each microscopic scale should have analogous condition of conservation of its
cardinality, i.e., the law of conservation of some qualitative property. Violation
of this law means conversion of initial cardinality into cardinality of another
scale.
The physical description of nature falls into a collection of different theories
steadily resisting unification. The complete description of the intermediate set
exhibits the same tendency. This is a consequence of the inherent structural
nonuniformity of the set. The theory of everything seems to be an unreal concept
analogous to the self-contradictory concept of the set of all sets. It is important
to note that this description (or rather the system of descriptions) follows from
the only assumption: the intermediate cardinality of the set. Nothing but several
choices of the simplest option was still required.
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